In the last year or so, research in the formal analysis of cryptographic protocols has matured to the point where researchers are going beyond the mechanics of verification and considering the problem of providing specification languages that make it easier to specify protocols for analysis. A number of different approaches are being applied. Some are modifying existing formal specification languages, while others are implementing languages that are closely based on existing informal specification styles. Likewise, some are implementing languages that are closely tied to existing tools, while others are implementing toolindependent languages. An effort is also underway to develop a common language, CAPSL, that will serve as an interface to other tools and languages.
The purpose of this panel is to bring together those who are working on this problem to compare notes and explore current issues. Some of the questions we will consider are:
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
Why do we need languages for cryptographic protocol specification? What are the deficiencies of existing languages that make new ones desirable?
What features should a crypt0 protocol specification language have? What depth of abstraction should the language provide for encryption and other computations? What concepts should it include for expressing desired security objectives, assumed initial conditions, and scenario constraints, beyond the mechanics of how the protocol actually operates?
How expressive does a language need to be? To what extent, and in what manner, should it be extensible to specify new or more detailed characterizations of protocol computations? What should be built-in?
What are the advantages/disadvantages of a language that is compatible with current informal specification styles?
What are the advantages/disadvantages of extending an existing language versus creating a new one? 6. How compatible are the different specification languages? Can they be made to work together?
The panelists are Catherine Meadows (NRL, panel chair), Martin Abadi (DEC), Stephen Brackin (ARCA), Gavin Lowe (University of Leicester), and Jonathan Millen (MITRB). All have experience developing languages for specifying cryptographic protocols. Martin Abadi and Andrew Gordon have modified an existing language for specifying mobile computation, the Pi calculus, into a language for specifying cryptographic protocols, the Spi calculus [ 11. Galvin Lowe has developed a language, Casper, that can be used as a front end for the PDR model checker [3] . Jonathan Millen is developing a language, CAPSL, intended to be a common interface for all protocol analysis tools [5] . Catherine Meadows has developed a specification language based on asynchronous state machines for her NRL Protocol Analyzer, which uses a. combination of state exploration and theorem proving [4] . Stephen Brackin has developed a language, ISL, for his Automatic Authentication Protocol Analyzer, which uses HOL proofs based on the Gong-Needham Yahalom belief logic [2] . He is building CAPSL interfaces for both the AAPA and the NRL Protocol Analyzer.
